This paper studies firms' endogenous choices of prices and product characteristics pre-and post-merger. The paper finds that firms' adjustments of post-merger prices and product characteristics depend on pre-merger market shares, net benefits of improving product characteristics (Definition 2.1), overall production efficiencies (Definition 2.2) and threshold market shares that balance marginal cost and markup
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Understanding how firms make production decisions is of fundamental importance in economics. The classic approach considers firms' optimal choices of prices to maximize profits [1, 3, 4, 25, 30] . While the literature considers endogenous prices, product characteristics are usually held exogenous. The assumption of exogenous product characteristics does bring concerns. Firstly, since product characteristics affect consumers' purchasing decisions and also the costs of production, it is reasonable that firms could gain a higher profit by adjusting product characteristics. Allowing both prices and product characteristics to be endogenous could potentially improve firms' profits and necessitate the reconsideration of the classical pricing theory with exogenous product characteristics. Secondly, endogenous product characteristics are generally supported by real data. Firms' adjustments over their product characteristics are widely observed in real applications [22, 29, 9, 15, 32, 33, 14, 11, 8] .
Both concerns suggest that we should consider endogeneity of both prices and product characteristics as we study firms' competition behavior. Therefore, a re-evaluation of firms' pricing and product repositioning incentives is an important and timely research topic.
Realizing the importance and necessity of endogenous product characteristics, the current guidelines for merger analysis shall be reconsidered for improvement. The current benchmark merger guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission mainly focus on firms' adjustments of prices post-merger. Product characteristics are usually assumed to be exogenous and remain constant pre-and post-merger [6, 7, 13, 18, 26] .
However, constant and exogenous product characteristics are unduly demanding assumptions and are generally not supported by real data, as we observe in many merger cases that firms change their product characteristics post-merger [2, 12, 24, 20, 23, 27] . While it becomes a more realistic concern when conducting merger analysis, the frontier literature has started to consider changes in firms' product characteristics in the process of merger evaluation. A series of recent papers [5, 10, 17, 19, 21, 23, 28, 31] has considered firms' optimal product characteristics in a variety of merger applications. Among them, Mazzeo (2003) [23] studied the U.S. airline industry and found that carriers' on-time performance is likely to deteriorate when markets become less competitive.
His later paper (2012) [24] found that this observation could have substantial effects by allowing for repositioning, particularly in cases where the merging parties offered relatively similar products prior to the merger. Peters (2006) [27] showed that a merged airline tends to reduce flight frequency on segments where the merging carriers were competing with each other. Watson(2008) [33] focused on product variety decision in terms of the number of product offerings sold by eyewear retailers. It is found therein that per-firm product variety has a nonmonotonic relationship with competition. This finding again suggests that the optimal response following a merger could be either to increase or to decrease product variety. Gramlich (2009) [17] developed and estimated a model of the U.S. automobile industry in which firms choose the fuel efficiency of their new vehicles. In their model, firms provide more or less fuel efficiency depending on the stochastically changing gas price. Lee (2013) [20] studied the merger of Delta and Northwest Airlines and found that: 1) the merged firm tends to increase product differentiation post-merger, and 2) the higher product differentiation reduces the firm's incentive to raise prices. He also argued that endogenizing product characteristics is essential to better predict the actual outcomes as the simulated results become closer to actual post-merger data. The results from these papers indicate that firms make distinct changes to their product characteristics, in addition to changes in prices post-merger.
However, there are some limitations of the existing works. Since the existing works are all case-by-case studies, there is a lack of generalized framework to serve as a merger guideline. Moreover, the often inconsistent conclusions among researchers make the generalized theorem a challenge to derive. For example, a series of papers including Berry and Waldfoger (2001) [5] , Gandhi et al (2008) [14] and Sweeting (2010) [31] showed that merged firms tend to increase product differentiation to avoid market cannibalization. On the other hand, Gotz and Gugler (2006) [16] found that higher concentration in the retail gasoline market reduces product variety. Secondly, the current literature imposes strong assumptions of firms' homogenous production technology in order to recover costs of production. The assumption rules out the possibility that firms can be endowed with different production technologies, which is actually one of the key reasons that firms have different incentives to merge and induce different post-merger outcomes.
This paper uses disaggregate level data and studies firms' product repositioning and pricing incentives post-merger. The paper studies how the inclusion of endogenous product characteristics could affect firms' post-merger prices, product characteristics and market shares. Motivated by the limitations of the current merger guidelines and the existing literature, this paper has two major contributions: 1) allowing firms to be differentiated in their production technologies and studying how heterogeneous productivities shall affect postmerger outcomes; 2) generalizing conditions to predict different post-merger outcomes under different market conditions, including changes in post-merger market shares, prices and product characteristics for both merged and nonmerging firms. The paper finds that firms' adjustments of post-merger market shares, prices, and product characteristics are determined by pre-merger levels of market shares, net benefits of improving each product characteristic by one unit (Definition 2.1), overall production efficiencies (Definition 2.2) and threshold market shares that balance marginal cost and markup effects (Definition 2.3). The generalized theorem (our main Theorem 3.1) is then presented to predict post-merger outcomes for both merged and non-merging firms under different market conditions. The generalized theorem is then applied to study the 2010 merger of United and Continental Airlines. The empirical application suggests that the main theorem of the paper achieves high prediction accuracy in predicting post-merger outcomes in market shares, flight frequencies, and airfares for both the merged and non-merging firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes the model with endogenous prices and product characteristics and generalizes conditions to predict post-merger market outcomes. Section 3 characterizes the generalized theorem for post-merger predictions of market shares, prices and product characteristics for both merged and non-merging firms. Section 4 describes the data and the basic features of the U.S. airline industry. Section 5 discusses the identification strategy for estimating the demand and supply sides of the U.S. airline industry. Section 6 presents the estimation results and the merger prediction based on the estimated values of model parameters. Comparisons between the predicted post-merger changes of market shares, prices and product characteristics with the actual observed post-merger changes of the market outcomes are also shown in Section 6. The paper concludes in Section 7.
MODEL
In this section, we shall propose a model to study endogenous changes of firms' market shares, product characteristics and prices for both merged and non-merging firms post-merger. We shall consider a market with J firms, and each firm produces a product which can allow changes in K dimensions of product characteristics. The proposed model is based on the discrete choice framework as each consumer purchases the product with the highest utility.
We consider the market with J major firms existing pre-merger. Without loss of generality, we assume firm 1 and firm 2 decide to merge. After the merger, firm 2 renames to firm 1 and adopts the same brand reputation and technology from firm 1. The new merged firm only produces the product of firm 1. There are (J-1) firms existing in the market post-merger, with firm 1 as the merged firm and firm 3 to firm J as the non-merging firms. Our model is general as the number of firms J and the number of product characteristics K can be any arbitrary number. We shall first propose the model by characterizing the demand and supply sides of the market pre-and post-merger. We then propose three definitions which are the key factors to determine post-merger market outcomes. In the end, we shall propose the main theorem.
Demand Side Pre-merger
We first characterize the demand side of the market in the pre-merger period.
Let i, j and t be the consumer, firm and time index, respectively. The utility of consumer i choosing product j at time t is characterized as
for j = {1, ..., J}. P jt is the price for product j. Z jt = [Z j1t , ..., Z jKt ] are the K major product characteristics that affect the consumer's utility. ξ j is the brand fixed effect of firm j. ξ jt contains the unobserved product characteristics term that also affects the consumer's utility. ε ijt is the idiosyncratic shock term and follows type 1 extreme value distribution. To simplify the model, we assume that the individual's variation in the utility comes from the idiosyncratic shock term and we here do not consider the interaction of individual demographics with product attributes. By the property of type 1 extreme value (T1EV) distribution, the market share of firm j at time t is characterized as
, for j = {1, ..., J}. We assume that the consumer could also choose not to purchase any of the J products and instead purchase from the outside option.
In this case, the consumer's utility of purchasing the outside option is
and the market share of the outside option is (4)
.
Supply Side Pre-merger
In this section, we shall describe each firm's profit maximization decision before the merger. Since we allow both price and product characteristics to be endogenous, each firm shall choose its optimal price and product characteristics simultaneously to maximize its profit. The profit of firm j is
where N is the total mass of consumers, S jt is the market share for firm j characterized in equation (2) above, P jt is the price that firm j charges to its consumers, mc jt is firm j's marginal cost of production, and F ixed jt is firm j's fixed cost of production. It is sensible to assume that a firm's choices of product characteristics Z jt shall affect both its marginal cost and fixed cost of production, as a high product quality should always require a higher amount of marginal and fixed costs to produce. In line with the large portion of the existing literature [20, 12] , we take the assumptions of a linear marginal cost and a quadratic fixed cost of each firm as a function of its product characteristics. 
Necessary Conditions Pre-merger
In this section, we shall derive the pre-merger necessary conditions with respect to product characteristics and price for each firm. By solving the necessary conditions, we can characterize each firm's equilibrium product price and characteristics as a function of its equilibrium market share. For each firm j ∈ {1, ..., J}, the necessary conditions for the optimal price P jt and product characteristics Z jt are characterized as (Appendix Note 1)
for k = {1, ..., K} and j = {1, ..., J}, where
Given that each firm chooses the optimal product characteristics and price to maximize its profit, we shall further simplify the necessary conditions for each firm pre-merger as (Appendix Note 2)
for k = {1, ..., K} and j = {1, ..., J}. Rewriting equations (10) and (11) enables us to write the equilibrium product characteristics Z jkt and price P jt as a function of the firm's equilibrium market share S jt
for k = {1, ..., K} and j = {1, ..., J}. Based on equations (12) and (13) , solving the equilibrium market share guarantees the solutions of equilibrium product characteristics and price for each firm. These, together with the post-merger necessary conditions for each firm, enable us to characterize the changes of firms' post-merger prices and product characteristics based on the changes of firms' post-merger market shares, which we shall discuss in the later section.
Prediction of Post-merger Market Shares
In this section, we shall reconsider the demand and supply sides of the market in the post-merger period, and we shall study how the merger of two firms shall affect the post-merger market outcomes, in particular of firms' equilibrium market shares, product characteristics and prices. We now consider the merger of firm 1 and firm 2. The merged firm decides to keep only one product in the market, while the other one is forced to exit the market. Without loss of generality, we assume that the merged firm shall keep the product of firm 1, while the product of firm 2 exits the market post-merger. After the merger, there are (J-1) firms existing in the market, with firm 1 as the merged firm and firm 3 to firm J as the non-merging firms.
In the post-merger period, both the merged and non-merging firms shall choose the optimal post-merger prices and product characteristics to maximize profits. For firm 1 and firm 3 to firm J, the necessary conditions shall be the same as what we derive in equations (8) and (9) above, with the market shares consisting of (J-1) firms instead of J firms in the post-merger period.
Simplifying the necessary conditions for firm 1 and firm 3 to J suggests the same relation of each firm's equilibrium price and product characteristics with its market share as in the pre-merger period. In another way to say that, equations (12) and (13) stay the same pre-and post-merger for both firm 1 and firm 3 to firm J.
In order to tell how the post-merger market share changes for each firm, we first take the ratio of each firm's market share with respect to the market share of the outside option
for j = {1, ..., J}. We then apply equations (12) and (13) to substitute each firm's price P jt and product characteristics Z jt as a function of its market share
where
Solving equation (15) for each firm suggests a positive relation of each firm's market share with the market share of the outside option (Appendix Note 3).
In other words, equation (15) suggests that there exists a strictly increasing function that characterizes the market share of each firm as a function of the market share of the outside option, i.e.
Recall that the above relation is the same in both the pre-and post-merger periods. We then combine the above relation with the market share conditions in both the pre-and post-merger periods to characterize the direction of changes of firms' post-merger market shares.
In the pre-merger period, there are J firms existing in the market. Hence the market share condition requires that
Based on equation (15), we know that the left hand side of equation (17) is a strictly increasing function in S 0t . Therefore, solving the above equation can uniquely determine the equilibrium market share of the outside option premerger, i.e. S pre * 0t . We can then recover the equilibrium market share of each firm pre-merger accordingly, i.e. S pre * jt
Recall that since the relation of the equilibrium market share, price and product characteristics remain the same pre-and post-merger for firm 1 and firm 3 to firm J, the function S * jt = f jt (S * 0t ) shall remain the same pre-and post-merger for those firms. After the merger, the product of firm 2 is no longer in the market. Thus in the post-merger period, the market share condition becomes
) is a strictly increasing function in S 0t , we know that the equilibrium market share for the outside option is bigger in the post- To conclude this section, we find that if the merged firm decides to keep only one product post-merger, then the post-merger market shares increase for the outside option, the merged and non-merging firms. We shall apply this conclusion together with firms' necessary conditions to understand the merger's effect on post-merger product prices and characteristics for both the merged and non-merging firms in the later section.
Prediction of Post-merger Prices and Product Characteristics
Knowing the changes of firms' post-merger market shares, we can predict the changes of post-merger prices and product characteristics for both the merged and non-merging firms based on equations (12) and (13) . Equation (13) Based on equation (13), we see a linear relation of firm j's product characteristics Z jkt with its market share S jt , for k = {1, ..., K}. Thus the derivative of firm j's k-th product characteristic with respect to its market share is (19) dZ
for k = {1, ..., K} and j = {1, ..., J}. For each firm j, the derivative implies the direction of change for firm j's k-th post-merger product characteristic together with its market share. If
> 0, and the k-th post-merger product characteristic and market share shall move in the same direction. On the other hand, if
< 0, and the k-th post-merger product characteristic and market share shall move in the opposite direction. It is reasonable to assume that the marginal fixed cost coefficient δ jk is positive, thus the change of direction for firm j's k-th postmerger product characteristic is determined by the term of α −1 β k − γ jk . In essence, the term α −1 β k quantifies the relative benefit of improving the k-th product characteristic relative to price. The term γ jk indicates the marginal cost of improving the k-th product characteristic for one unit. Therefore, the term α −1 β k − γ jk measures the net benefit of firm j to increase its k-th product characteristic for one unit. We thereby propose the following definition.
The net benefit of firm j to increase its k-th product characteristic for one unit is defined as
for k = {1, ..., K} and j = {1, ..., J}. If b jk > 0, the firm would like to increase its k-th product characteristic when its post-merger market share becomes larger. If b jk < 0, the firm would like to decrease its k-th product characteristic when its post-merger market share becomes larger. For the firm with a better production technology, γ jk is smaller and the net benefit to increase its k-th product characteristic is more likely to be positive. Thus the firm is more likely to increase its k-th product characteristic when it expands the market share.
For the firm with an inefficient production technology, γ jk will be bigger and the net benefit to increase its k-th product characteristic term is more likely to be negative. Thus it may be too costly for the firm to improve its k-th product characteristic and the post-merger product characteristic would move in the opposite direction with the market share. Moreover, if the merger happens in the market with consumers valuing more of the k-th product characteristic or being less sensitive to price, then α −1 β k is more likely to be bigger and b jk is more likely to be positive. In this case, the post-merger k-th product characteristic is more likely to improve together with the post-merger market share. If the merger happens in the market with consumers valuing less of the k-th product characteristic or being more sensitive to price, then α −1 β k is more likely to be smaller and b jk is more likely to be negative. In this case, the post-merger k-th product characteristic is more likely to move in the opposite direction with the post-merger market share.
Once the changes of firm j's post-merger market share and product characteristics are known, we can then predict the change of firm j's post-merger product price by equation (12) . Equation (12) characterizes a non-linear relation of firm j's product price with its market share. We shall first denote the marginal cost and the markup term for each firm as
The price of firm j can therefore be written as a combination of the two terms: marginal cost and markup terms.
Based on equation (21), we find that there is a linear relation of the firm's marginal cost with its market share. Thus whether firm j's marginal cost increases or not with the market share is determined by the term
which measures the overall production efficiency of firm j. Moreover, based on equation (22), there is a non-linear relation of the firm's mark up with its market share. A higher market share always suggests a higher markup for the firm. We shall propose the following definition.
The overall production efficiency of firm j is defined as
When b j > 0, increasing firm j's market share shall increase the marginal cost for the firm, i.e.
dmc jt dS jt > 0. The increase in firm j's market share shall also give the firm a higher market power and thus increase its markup, i.e.
dσ jt dS jt > 0. In that case, both the marginal cost and markup effects work in the same direction. The price shall increase with a higher market share of firm j, i.e. dP jt dS jt > 0. On the other hand, when b j < 0, the marginal cost and markup effects work in the opposite direction and whether the post-merger price increases or not shall depend on which effect dominates. To tell which effect dominates, we shall derive the slope of change of firm j's price as a function of its market share
For b j < 0, we know that the marginal cost effect is negative and the markup effect is positive, i.e. The generalized conditions and predictions of post-merger outcomes shall be rigorously presented in the main theorem; c.f. Theorem 3.1 in Section 3.
GENERALIZED THEOREM FOR POST-MERGER PREDICTION
Now we shall present the main theorem by generalizing conditions for postmerger predictions of firms' market shares, product characteristics, and prices under the assumptions that there are no consumers' preference changes and cost efficiency gains post-merger. There are a number of implications of Theorem 3.1 that we shall discuss. Remark 2 The condition gets more complicated for post-merger prices.
When the firm's overall production efficiency is positive, i.e. b j > 0, both the marginal cost and markup effects are positive, and the post-merger price shall increase when the firm's post-merger market share increases. In that case, the positive correlation holds regardless of firm j's pre-merger market share. If the firm's overall production efficiency is negative, i.e. b j < 0 and firm j has a small market share pre-merger, i.e. S jt < S c j , the positive markup effect is too small to offset the negative marginal cost effect, and hence the overall effect is negative, i.e.
dP jt dS jt < 0. In that case, the post-merger price shall decrease when the post-merger market share increases for firm j. On the other hand, when the overall production efficiency term is negative, i.e. b j < 0 but firm j's pre-merger market share is sufficient, i.e. S jt > S c j , the firm has a big market power to induce a higher markup effect. In that case, the markup effect will dominate, and the post-merger price shall decrease with the market share.
To summarize, the post-merger changes of firm j's market share, as well as price and product characteristics are endogenously determined by the firm's pre-merger market share, the firm's net benefit of increasing the product characteristic terms, i.e. b jk , the firm's overall production efficiency term, i.e. b j , and the threshold market share term that balances the marginal cost and the markup effects, i.e. S c j .
Prediction of Post-merger Outcomes
Applying the theorem above, we can predict the post-merger changes of market shares, product characteristics, and prices for both the merged and non-merging firms. We shall list the conditions required for all possible post- From Table I , the post-merger market shares shall increase for both firm 1 and firm 3. The changes in post-merger prices and product characteristics, however, can go either way, depending on firm j's net benefit of improving the major product characteristic relative to price, i.e. b j1 and the threshold market share that balances the marginal cost and markup effects, i.e. S For the merger of United and Continental Airlines in 2010, we shall focus the study on the routes that overlap for the two merged airlines, with the total number of passengers exceeding ten thousand. We look at the pre-merger periods and find there are 8 overlapping airport pairs/16 origin-dest one-way routes that both United and Continental Airlines serve. We shall summarize the pre-merger number of passengers and the conditional market shares for those 16 overlapping routes in Table II .
For those 16 overlapping routes, both United and Continental Airlines have significant market shares. And for the two-way routes of SFO-IAH, EWR-SFO
and EWR-DEN, United and Continental Airlines are the only two operation carriers, and hence obtain monopoly power on those routes. We expect the merger may have an effect on the non-overlapping routes as well, and we shall leave this concern to future work.
Data Description
In this paper we use the data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, which contains disaggregated level data from the demand and supply sides of the U.S. airline industry. The primary datasets for our empirical study include the Airline Origin and Destination Survey, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, and
Airline Fuel Cost and Consumption Data. We construct the average airfare per mile using the Airline Origin and Destination Survey, and the flight frequency using the T-100 Domestic Segment Data. Besides, we use the Airline Fuel Cost and Consumption Data to calculate the fuel cost per gallon for each airline.
The datasets are summarized in Table III .
IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
This section addresses the identification strategy for estimating the demand and supply sides of the U.S. airline industry. We shall use the estimation results to predict post-merger outcomes applying Theorem 3.1. We shall discuss the identification strategy and the choices of instrument variables for the demand and supply side estimation. The estimation results and the comparison of predicted post-merger changes with real observed post-merger changes shall be shown in the later sections.
Demand Estimation
To estimate the demand side of the airline market, we shall first form the consumer's utility function. We shall define one origin-destination airport pair as one submarket and the flight offered by each airline as one product in the submarket. Thus, consumer i's utility of choosing airline j on submarket r at time t is defined as
where Z jrt is the product characteristic of flight j and P jrt is the airfare of is sensible to assume that the higher fuel cost per route, the higher the airfare would be. For flight frequencies, we use the hub status and the population of the origin and destination cities at each time as the instruments (H j , P rt ). If the origin and/or destination airport has the airline hub or has a bigger population size, then we would expect the flight frequency to be higher for that airline in the submarket. To find a proxy for the population at the endpoint cities, we shall calculate the total passengers that fly in and out of the two endpoint airports.
Supply Estimation
After estimating the demand side of the airline industry, we can then recover the marginal cost for each airline on each submarket by the necessary condition
Observing the pre-merger price and market share for each airline and having estimated the consumer's utility function from the demand side, we can then recover the marginal cost for each airline in each submarket and time by equation (29) above. Different from the classical approach, we shall consider heterogeneity in firms' production technologies. Heterogenous production technologies shall play an important role in explaining firms' different merger incentives and post-merger outcomes. To estimate the airlines' marginal costs of production, we adopt a linear marginal cost functional form from the existing literature. The marginal cost for each airline on each route and time shall depend on the airline's flight frequency and the residual term
where we expect that a higher flight frequency implies a higher marginal cost, i.e. γ j > 0. ω jrt is the residual term which could include other product characteristics and unobserved marginal cost terms. ω jrt is allowed to be correlated with the major product characteristic term, Z jrt . Hence instrument variables are required to obtain consistent estimation. We shall use the airlines' hub status and the population at the origin-and destination cities as the instruments for flight frequencies. After recovering each firm's marginal cost productivity,
i.e. γ j , we could then recover the value of the marginal fixed cost for each airline, route and time from the necessary condition
Observing the pre-merger market share and having estimated the demand and marginal cost sides of the airline industry, we can then calculate the marginal fixed cost for each airport on each submarket and time. We then estimate each airline's marginal fixed costs as a function of flight frequencies.
Recall that we adopt a quadratic form of firms' fixed costs
where we would expect a higher flight frequency implies a higher marginal fixed cost, i.e. δ j > 0. θ jrt is the unobserved fixed cost term and is allowed to be correlated with the observed product characteristic term Z jrt . Hence we shall apply the same set of instruments for flight frequencies. Once the estimation of the consumer's utility and firms' marginal and fixed costs are obtained, we can then form the measures of net benefit terms and threshold market share terms. We can then apply Theorem 3.1 to predict changes in firms' post-merger market shares, prices and flight frequencies. The estimation results are shown in Section 6.
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
This section describes the estimation results for the 2010 merger of United and Continental Airlines. We first estimate the demand side of the airline industry by estimating the consumer's utility function. We then recover the marginal and fixed costs for each airline from the conditions shown in equations (29) and (31) . Finally, the pre-merger estimation results are used to predict the post-merger outcomes according to Theorem 3.1. For the pre-merger period, we use the airline data that covers Q4 2009 to Q3 2010. In particular, we shall study the changes of market shares, average airfares and flight frequencies for United and the other airlines after the merger. We use the airline hub status and population at the origin-and end-point airports as the instruments for flight frequencies. We use the interaction of fuel cost per gallon of each airline with distance as the instruments for average airfares. The pre-merger estimation results are shown in Table IV , V, and VI. Table IV shows the estimation results of the consumer's utility function. We shall denote β to be the coefficient of flight frequency and α to be the coefficient of airfare. From the estimation, the consumer values flight frequency and is more likely to purchase from the airline which offers more frequent flights. A higher airfare shall decrease a consumer's utility. The airline fixed effect is the highest for United Airline, and Continental Airline has the second highest.
Other airlines, on average, have the lowest fixed effect. From Table IV, we can calculate the marginal benefit of improving flight frequency relative to airfare term, i.e. β/α. We then compare the marginal benefit with the marginal cost estimated in Table V to form the net benefit term and to predict changes in flight frequencies and airfares post-merger. Table V shows the estimation results of firms' marginal cost functions. We shall denote the marginal cost coefficient of flight frequency as γ j , which measures how costly it is to improve flight frequency by one unit. The estimation results in Table V imply that Continental Airline has a better production technology in terms of marginal cost compared to United Airline, i.e. γ 2 < γ 1 . The other airlines, on average, have the best production technology in terms of marginal cost compared to United and Continental Airlines. Combining these with Table IV , we can form the net benefits of improving flight frequency terms, i.e. b j1 = β/α − γ j > 0 for all three airlines. We then estimate the marginal fixed cost for each airline and the results are shown in Table VI below. Table VI We find that the few exceptions can be explained by realizing that a lot of events happened during that period besides the merger activity. In fact, by decomposing the airlines under the other category, we find that on the routes of LAX-OGG, OGG-LAX, LAX-HNL and HNL-LAX, the airlines included in the other airline category are the same pre-and post-merger, which suggests that there is no entries and exits of those airlines post-merger. However, on the routes of EWR-ORD, ORD-EWR, and ORD-IAH, IAH-ORD, we find that the entries and exits of some airlines made the other category not the same preand post-merger. This could potentially explain why the theorem predictions are not accurate on those routes. In addition, the inaccurate predictions on the few exceptions could also be explained by firms' changes of marginal and fixed cost productivities, and the consumer's changes of preferences over airfares and flight frequencies post-merger.
Overall, the comparison in Table VIII and IX suggests that Theorem 3.1 has a high prediction accuracy rate of 83.3% for predicting the changes of post-merger market shares, flight frequencies, and airfares for both United and the other airlines. Hence the theorem prediction is strongly supported by the airline merger application for both the merged and non-merging airlines.
CONCLUSION
Different from the current merger guidelines which predict an increase in post-merger prices under the restrictive assumption that product characteristics are exogenous, this paper allows the simultaneous endogeneity of both prices and product characteristics. The paper performs the merger analysis by providing the generalized theorem to predict post-merger changes of market shares, product characteristics, and prices for both the merged and nonmerging firms. The paper also makes contributions by allowing firms to be differentiated in their production technologies and studying how differentiated production technologies shall affect firms' pricing and product repositioning incentives post-merger. The paper finds that changes of firms' post-merger market outcomes depend on the consumer's utility and firms' marginal and fixed costs of production. In particular, firms' endogenous choices of post-merger market shares, product characteristics, and prices depend on the pre-merger market shares, i.e. S jt , net benefits of improving product characteristics, i.e. The generalized theorem is then applied to study the 2010 merger of United and Continental Airlines. We estimate the demand and supply sides of the airline industry using the pre-merger observed data. We then predict the postmerger changes of market shares, airfares, and flight frequencies for both the merged and non-merging firms based on the parameter estimation and Theorem 3.1. Comparing the theorem predicted post-merger changes with the actual observed post-merger changes suggests that the theorem has a high prediction accuracy power for predicting post-merger outcomes for both the merged and non-merging firms. The prediction accuracy rate is 83.3%. 
Appendix Note 2
Applying the equations in Note 1 above, the necessary conditions in equations (8) and (9) become:
for k = {1, ..., K} and j = {1, ..., J}. Simplifying the equations above suggests
Simplifying equations (39) and (40) further suggests that
for k = {1, ..., K} and j = {1, ..., J}.
Appendix Note 3
For each firm, equation (15) characterizes the relation of the market share of the outside option with the market share of firm j. We find that for any given S 0t , the left hand side of equation (15) is a linear function in S jt . As the market share of the outside option increases, the linear line becomes flatter but is always upward sloping. The right hand side of equation (15) is a non-linear function in S jt . To understand how the right hand side of equation (15) evolves with S jt , we shall first denote the function in the exponential symbol to be
The derivative of L jt (S jt ) with respect to S jt suggests that
We can tell from equation (44) above that the function L jt (S jt ) shall be upward sloping in S jt when S jt is sufficiently small and the function L jt (S jt ) shall be downward sloping in S jt when S jt is sufficiently big. As the value of S jt gets bigger, the slope becomes less positive and/or more negative.
Based on the analysis above, we could draw the curve of the RHS of equation (15) . Given its concave down shape and the y-intercept is positive, we know that the RHS shall intersect with the LHS at one point. By allowing the market share of the outside option to increase, the LHS would become flatter, and the RHS is not a function of S 0t . Hence the market share of firm j shall become bigger as the market share for the outside option increases. Hence we could characterize the market share of firm j as a function of the market share of the outside option, i.e. S jt = f jt (S 0t ), which we know would be strictly increasing.
Appendix Note 4
Given the market share of firm j is a strictly increasing function of the market share of the outside option, the LHS of equation (17) shall be an increasing function of S 0t . Solving equation (17) at 1 shall return the equilibrium market share of the outside option pre-merger. For the post-merger period, the functional forms of f 1t (S 0t ) and f 3t (S 0t ) to f Jt (S 0t ) stay the same as in the pre-merger period. Given that firm 2 no longer exists in the market, we know that the LHS of equation (18) shall lie beneath the LHS of equation (17) . By solving the post-merger market share condition at 1, we know that the postmerger equilibrium market share shall increase for the outside option, which also suggests the post-merger equilibrium market shares shall increase for firm 1 and firm 3 to firm J.
Appendix Note 5
In the study of the effective factors influencing the decision-making process of Iranian air travelers in their choice of airline for domestic flights, flight schedule/frequency was listed to be "the highest priority factors". In the Airport Cooperative Research Program sponsored by the Federal Aviatation Administration, the report claimed that "passengers generally prefer to use airports in which they have greater flexibiltiy in departure and arrival times, and they value multiple flight frequencies." 8.6. Appendix Tables   TABLE I   Prediction UA frequency CO frequency Others frequency † Instruments: ua-hub-origin ua-hub-dest co-hub-origin co-hub-dest others-hub-origin others-hub-dest ua-pop-origin ua-pop-dest co-pop-origin co-pop-dest others-pop-origin others-pop-dest UA frequency CO frequency Others frequency † Instruments: ua-hub-origin ua-hub-dest co-hub-origin co-hub-dest others-hub-origin others-hub-dest ua-pop-origin ua-pop-dest co-pop-origin co-pop-dest others-pop-origin others-pop-dest 
